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Abstract 
       This paper investigates how the 2008 financial crisis affects the accrual anomaly 
documented by Sloan (1996). I find that the accrual anomaly increases during the financial 
crisis period and the increase in accrual anomaly does not differ between firms relying and 
not relying on external financing. Additional analysis shows that arbitrage risk and 
transaction costs could have contributed to the increase in accrual anomaly during the 
financial crisis period.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
         The accrual1 anomaly documented by Sloan (1996) is an efficient market anomaly 
resulted from mispricing of accruals earnings. Extant studies show that accrual anomaly is 
associated with investors’ earnings fixation (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Hirshleifer, Hou, 
Teoh & Zhang, 2004; Hirshlefier, Lim & Teoh, 2011), firm growth (e.g., Fairfield, 
Whisenant & Yohn, 2003; Titman, Wei & Xie, 2004; Zhang, 2007), arbitrage risk or 
transaction costs (Mashruwala, Rajgopal, & Shevlin, 2006), and accruals characteristics 
such as  the relative persistence of accruals to cash (Green, Hand, & Soliman, 2011).  
Sloan (1996) suggests that naïve investors may lack the ability to tell the differences 
between accrued earnings and cash earnings and therefore fixate their attention on earning 
information as a whole and overprice the accrued earnings. Eventually, when accrued 
earnings are not realized as investors expect, the future stock price declines, leading to 
abnormal negative returns. This explanation is referred to as, “the earnings fixation 
hypothesis” (Dechow, Khimich, & Sloan, 2011). Hirshlefier et al. (2011) further argue that 
a psychological constraint called “the investor limited attention” is a possible explanation 
for investors’ incapability to tell the difference between accrual earnings and cash earnings. 
Although both sophisticated and naïve investors may be subject to behavioral bias such as 
limited attention, Hirshlefier et al. (2011) and other researchers (e.g., Collins, Gong & 
                                                          
1 Accrual accounting is an accounting procedure to anticipate future cash receipts and cash payment (IASB, 
2010).  Accordingly, accrual earnings are the income that have been made but have not been received yet 
and their delivery is not guaranteed (Dechow, Khimich and Sloan, 2011). Therefore, they essentially are an 
estimation of future cash income and have lower reliability and persistence (Dechow et al, 2011). In an 
efficient market, we expect to observe no association between the level of accruals and future stock return 
because rational investors should be able to price the lower persistence of accruals correctly and assign a 
lower price to firms with high accruals. However, Sloan (1996) found otherwise. 
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Hribar, 2003; Ali & Gurun, 2009) argue that sophisticated and professional investors are 
less subjected  to limited attention than naïve and individual investors.   
In the meantime, researchers argue that accrual anomaly could be a growth-related 
anomaly (e.g., Fairfield et al., 2003; Titman et al., 2004; Zhang, 2007). For example, 
Fairfield et al. (2003) argue that accrual anomaly could be a special case of a broader 
growth anomaly.  Zhang (2007) finds that growth is positively correlated with accrual 
anomaly and accruals capture not only information about earnings but also information 
about investment and growth. In addition to earnings fixation and firm growth explanation, 
Mashruwala et al. (2006) suggest that arbitrage risk and transaction costs could prevent the 
accrual anomaly to be arbitraged away; Green et al. (2011) argue that the level of accrual 
anomaly may increase when the relative persistence of accruals to cash flows increases.  
The recent 2007-2008 financial crisis has a dramatic impact on investors’ investing 
activities (Duchin, Ozbas & Sensoy, 2010) and firms’ financial activities (Kahle & Stulz, 
2013). For example, researchers (e.g. Ben-David, Franzoni, & Moussawi, 2012; He, Khang, 
& Krishnamurthy, A, 2010) document that the 2008 financial crisis discouraged hedge fund 
activities and as a result, the proportion of sophisticated investors who can tell the 
difference between the persistence of cash flow and accrual in the market may decline. In 
contrast to the decline in the activities in sophisticated investors, several studies document 
that retail investors still traded actively during the financial crisis period (e.g. Hoffmann, 
Post, & Pennings, 2013; Dorn & Weber, 2013; Merkle & Weber, 2014) . If earnings 
fixation is the main factor driving accrual anomaly, the decrease in the activities of 
sophisticated investors relative to naïve investors in equity market could lead to an increase 
in accrual anomaly. In addition, the 2008 financial crisis may also affect hedge fund 
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activities indirectly because the higher risk and uncertainty in the market could increase 
arbitrage risk and transaction costs, which could discourage hedge fund or other investors 
from arbitraging the mispricing of accruals or prevent them from arbitraging successfully 
(Mashruwala et al., 2006). Therefore, the accrual anomaly may also increase as a result of 
an increase in arbitrate risk and transaction costs.   
The financial crisis also has a greater impact on firms that highly rely on external 
financing than on firms that rely on external financing to a lesser extent (Dell'Ariccia, 
Detragiache, & Rajan, 2008).  If the 2008 financial crisis caused a shock to firms’ financing 
and investing activities and accrual anomaly is a type of growth anomaly, I expect to 
observe the increase in accrual anomaly is less pronounced for firms heavily relying on 
external financing than for firms relying on external financing to a lesser extent. 
           Using data in Compustat and CRSP from 2004 to 2009, I employ the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression model to test my predictions. The results show that accrual 
anomaly increases during the financial crisis period, confirming my first prediction. This 
increase in accrual anomaly can be due to a decrease in hedge funds activities and an 
increase of arbitrage risk and transaction costs that can prevent investors to arbitrage away 
the mispricing of accruals (Mashruwala et al., 2006). Second, I do not find any evidence 
that supports the growth-based hypothesis: the increase of accrual anomaly during the 
financial crisis is similar for firms with a high reliance on external financing versus those 
that do not, suggesting firm growth did not affect accrual anomaly.  
My study contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, my study 
provides empirical evidence that the magnitude of accrual anomaly increases during the 
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financial crisis and such increase could be due to a decrease in hedge fund activities, an 
increase in arbitrage risk and transaction costs. Second, this is the first paper studying 
accrual anomaly in the financial crisis setting. Third, the paper documents that how 
different variables such as arbitrage risk, transaction costs and accruals behave during the 
2008 financial crisis period and provide some insight for investors to deal with market 
inefficiency during the financial crisis period.  
            This dissertation proceeds as follows. The next section reviews previous literature 
in accrual anomaly. In section 3, I develop the hypotheses. In Section 4, I discuss the 
research design and variable measurement. Section 5 discusses sample and descriptive 
statistics. Section 6 discusses the results followed by section 7 with conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Accrual Anomaly  
2.1.1 Earning Fixation Explanation  
       Sloan (1996) investigates whether stock market prices are able to fully reflect 
information about future earnings contained in the accrual and cash flow components of 
current earnings. Sloan (1996) finds that the accrual component of earnings displays lower 
persistence than the cash flow component of earnings due to the subjectivity involved in 
estimating accrual earnings. Stock market prices fail to distinguish such differences 
between the persistence of the accrual component of earnings and the cash flow component 
of earnings, leading to an under-reaction to cash earnings and an over-reaction to accrual 
earnings. Sloan (1996) indicates that these reactions might be because naïve investors only 
“fixate” on the earnings figure on the financial statement without knowing the different 
properties of accrual earnings and cash flow earnings. As a result, when naïve investors 
interpret earnings information, they usually overweight the value of accrual earnings and 
underweight the value of cash flow earnings since earnings are taken into consideration as 
a whole by investors. Sloan (1996) documents that firms with high reported accruals tend 
to have low abnormal stock returns in subsequent periods as compared to firms with low 
reported accruals. He argues that such phenomena occurs because investors are unable to 
distinguish the persistence between different earnings components. The phenomena that 
there is a negative association between current accrual earnings and future stock returns is 
called accrual anomaly and Sloan (1996)’s explanation for the cause of accrual anomaly is 
referred to as, “the earnings fixation explanation” (Dechow et al., 2011).  
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In general, subsequent studies find evidence supporting the earnings fixation 
explanation. For example, Xie (2001) finds that accrual anomaly is caused mainly by 
discretionary accruals (abnormal accruals). 2   Xie (2001) suggests that discretionary 
accruals are influenced by managers reporting incentives and contain a greater amount of 
low persistence components. However, investors have difficulty discerning managers’ 
reporting discretion and are not able to distinguish the persistence of discretionary accruals 
from the persistence of normal accruals. Consequently, since they are unable to distinguish 
the low persistence of discretionary accruals, investors assign a high weight to the high 
level of discretionary accruals, and when the discretionary accruals are not realized in the 
subsequent period, the stock price falls, resulting in negative abnormal returns.  
Recent papers on accrual anomaly (e.g., Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005) 
document evidence consistent with Xie (2001), indicating that the estimation error in 
accruals (reliability of accrual) is associated with the lower persistence of accruals and a 
greater mispricing. Furthermore, Hirshlefier et al. (2011) document that a single 
psychological constraint, limited attention, is the reason for investors’ incapability to 
understand information in accruals and this causes accrual anomaly. These studies suggest 
that the existence of accrual anomaly is mainly due to investors’ fixation on the level of 
earnings and their failure to understand the low persistence of accrual earnings caused by 
the subjectivity and estimation errors involved in reporting accrual earnings.  
           While Sloan (1996) attributes accrual anomaly to investors’ failure in understanding 
the persistence of accrual and cash flow earnings, researchers continue to investigate 
                                                          
2 Managers have substantial discretion over the amounts and the timing of accruals. If managers exercise 
this discretion to report certain amount of accruals, these accruals are called discretionary accruals. 
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whether sophisticated investors are equipped with better skills to distinguish the persistence 
between the two components of earnings. For example, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2000) 
investigate whether the accrual anomaly is attenuated if firms have a higher percentage of 
sophisticated investors. However, they find that the negative relationship between accrual 
earning and the subsequent annual stock returns is even bigger in larger firms (i.e., firms 
with more sophisticated investors) than in smaller firms (i.e., firms with less sophisticated 
investors). Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001) find that even sophisticated analysts 
and auditors do not fully use the information in accruals and their attention is also fixated 
on earnings. Zach (2006) finds that evidence on association between abnormal returns and 
accrual reversals in high accrual firms but not in low accrual firms, suggesting that “the 
earnings fixation explanation” may only be able to explain the accrual anomaly observed 
in high accrual firms. These findings raise doubt regarding Sloan’s (1996) argument that 
the accrual anomaly is caused by earnings fixation of naïve investors. Hirshleifer et al. 
(2004), on the other hand, find that investors tend to focus on net income profitability as a 
whole rather than cash profitability and overvalue the firms whose net operating income 
outstrip free cash flow, providing strong support for Sloan’s (1996) argument. Collins et 
al., (2003) also find that firms with high institutional ownership have less accrual anomaly. 
In addition, researchers also argue that accrual anomaly could be too costly to be arbitraged 
away (Lev & Nissim, 2006; Ali, Chen, Yao & Yu, 2008). 
          Researchers also investigate whether earnings fixation is more pronounced in high 
sentiment3 periods, leading to a greater mispricing of accrual earnings in such a period. Ali 
                                                          
3 Investor sentiment is the belief about the direction of stock price in the future and the investment risk, 
unjustified by the facts (Baker & Wurgler, 2007). 
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et al. (2009) and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) find evidence that accrual anomaly is 
stronger for small firms during high investor sentiment because investors tend to be overly 
optimistic about the market during that period of time.  
2.1.2 Growth-Based Explanation   
             Researchers also argue that accrual anomaly is related to firm growth.  Fairfield et 
al. (2003) argues that accrual is not just a component of earnings but also a component of 
growth in net operating assets. They find that both accrual earnings and growth in net 
operating assets have a negative relationship with future returns on assets. They suggest 
that investors overvalue the accruals because they overvalue the growth of the firms they 
invest in and the investment firms made. Zhang (2007) provides evidence directly linking 
firm investment/growth with the level of accruals. He demonstrates that accruals co-vary 
strongly with measures of firm growth (i.e., growth in the number of employees, 
investment in fixed assets) and accrual anomaly is more pronounced in firms with strong 
correlation between accruals and measures of growth. His finding suggests that accruals 
capture investment information, as well as earnings quality.  
       The growth-based explanation also attracts criticism (e.g., Titman et al., 2004; Cooper, 
Gulen, & Schill, 2006; Anderson & Garcia-Feijoo, 2006). Despite Fairfield et al.’s (2003) 
argument that accrual anomaly could be a special case of a more general growth anomaly, 
Wei and Xie (2008) find that although both capital investment anomaly and accrual 
anomaly are highly correlated with each other, there is a distinction between them because 
the mispricing from both accrual and capital investment is bigger than the mispricing from 
either of these two variables. There are also studies that provide empirical evidence directly 
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against the growth-based explanation. Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2006) and 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2006) find that accruals that are unrelated to sales 
perform better when predicting future returns than those accruals that are related to sales. 
Chu (2011) finds that for firms with negative operating capital, their net operating accruals 
and growth in sales move in opposite directions, suggesting that accrual anomaly does not 
link to firm growth. 4 
2.1.3 Other Explanations 
       Although a large amount of accrual anomaly studies focus on the earnings fixation 
explanation and the growth-based explanation, some other factors could explain accrual 
anomaly. Arbitrage risk could be one factor that influences accrual anomaly (Mashruwala 
et al., 2006). Mashruwala et al. (2006) indicate that in order to hedge the mispriced asset 
and make mispricing eventually disappear, arbitrageurs need to find perfect substitutes for 
shorted assets. However, if the substitute is not available, hedging will not be completely 
implemented and the mispricing will remain. Therefore, the lack of substitute is one type 
of arbitrage risk for the arbitrageurs. Accordingly, the greater the arbitrage risk the greater 
the mispricing of accruals.   
         Mashruwala et al. (2006) suggest that transaction cost is a factor that influences 
accrual anomaly because the higher transaction costs would prevent investors from 
arbitraging away the mispricing of accrual successfully. Using stock price as a proxy for 
                                                          
4 There is also a risk-based explanation for accrual anomaly, claiming abnormal return exists because of risk 
factors but not accruals (Dechow et al, 2011). Khan (2008) claims he is able to capture accruals by using a 
four-factor risk model but his research results are questioned by Hirshleifer, Hou, & Teoh (2012) and Ohlson, 
& Bilinski (2012). Both of them obtain results inconsistent with the theory the accruals reflect risk. 
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transaction cost,5 Mashruwala et al. (2006) find that accrual anomaly is stronger among 
stocks with low prices. Therefore, Mashruwala et al.’s (2006) finding suggests a positive 
relationship between transaction cost and accrual anomaly.  
         The characteristics of accruals could also affect accrual anomaly. Green et al. (2011) 
argue the relative persistence of accrual to cash could affect the magnitude of accrual 
anomaly. If the mispricing is due to inability of investors to tell the difference between 
accrual persistence level and cash persistence level, the larger the gap between these two, 
the larger accrual anomaly. Green et al. (2011) find the evidence supporting their argument. 
2.2 The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis  
        The 2007-2008 financial crisis occurred as a result of consumer defaults on subprime 
mortgages (Duchin et al., 2010). This crisis led to severe bank failures in U.S. history 
(Duchin et al., 2010) and has had a profound negative impact on investors and the capital 
market (e.g. Barberis, 2013; Duchin et al., 2010; Kahle et al., 2013). One thing that changes 
dramatically during this down market is hedge funds activities. Ben-David et al. (2012) 
find that hedge funds activities decrease during the financial crisis period mainly due to the 
financial constraints caused by credit shock. Unlike other funds, hedge funds are usually 
invested by institutional and sophisticated investors in order to profit from the market 
inefficiency, including accrual anomaly (e.g., Stein, 2009; Green et al., 2011). Combining 
a list of hedge funds from Thomson-Reuters and mandatory institutional quarterly portfolio 
holdings reports, Ben-David et al. (2012) find that equity holding in hedge funds decrease 
almost 20% on average during the financial crisis period.  He et al. (2010) also find that 
                                                          
5 Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) argue that there is a direct inverse relationship between the stock price and 
transaction cost. 
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hedge funds capital decreased about 337 billion in total using data from Hedge Fund Flow 
Report by Barclay Hedge (2009). On the other hand, using CRSP Mutual Fund Database, 
Ben-David et al. (2012) find that the decrease of mutual fund activities during the financial 
crisis is only one-third of the decrease of hedge fund activities and argue that the difference 
could come from the different investor base in these two types of funds.6 Furthermore, 
using 2007–09 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) panel data from the Federal Reserve 
Board, Bricker et al. (2011) point out that equity holding of individual investors in US 
market fall by about 5% during the financial crisis period, suggesting a smaller decrease of 
individual investors’ activities during financial crisis compared to the decrease of 
professional investors’ activities. Furthermore, researchers find that the individual 
investors were still very active in the market during the financial crisis: using brokerage 
records of Netherlands’ individual investors and buy-sell ratio analysis, Hoffmann et al. 
(2013) find that individual investors’ net buying activities increase significantly during the 
financial crisis period, indicating that individual investors tend to enter the market instead 
of de-risking their investment during the financial crisis.  Dorn et al. (2013) also use the 
brokerage records of individual investors in a German bank to study investor behaviour 
during the financial crisis. They find that that the bank’s brokerage client population 
actually increased during the financial crisis period. Using transaction data from a UK 
brokerage provider and also buy-sell ratio analysis, Merkle et al. (2014) also find that the 
net buying behaviour from individual investors in the UK market during the financial crisis.          
                                                          
6 The mutual fund investors are mainly retail investors who are less sophisticated than institutional 
investors who dominate hedge funds exclusively (Ben-David et al., 2010). 
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Besides hedge fund activities, other factors may have also changed during the 
financial crisis period and affect the magnitude of accrual anomaly. For example, during 
the 2008 financial crisis, market liquidity decreased sharply due to liquidity shock (Cornett, 
McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011). Therefore, it is possible that the substitutes for 
arbitrage would be more difficult to find during the financial crisis. In a similar way, when 
the market is down, transaction costs could increase because of higher risk, higher 
uncertainty, and lower liquidity.  
The financial crisis in 2008 also led to a significant credit supply shock (Ivashina & 
Scharfstein, 2010). Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) show that many firms, 
especially those financially constrained firms experienced investment cuts, dividend 
reductions, and decrease of cash saving during the financial crisis. Furthermore, many 
firms experienced a decrease in net equity issuance and expected cash flow (Kahle et al., 
2013). Although firms with access to credit lines may be able to ease the impact of the 
financial crisis on their investment plans, many firms have to decrease their investment or 
even sell their assets in order to survive (Campello, Giambona, Graham, & Harvey, 2001). 
Therefore, the financial crisis forced many firms to go through the disinvestment and/or 
reduction of firm assets. Such effect is particularly stronger for the firm with low cash 
reserves or higher net short-term debt (Duchin et al., 2010) and younger firms (Iyer, Peydró, 
da-Rocha-Lopes, & Schoar, 2014). More importantly, Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008) find that 
firms highly reliant on external financing are hurt more by the financial crisis due to credit 
supply shock than those not highly reliant on external financing. Since firms highly reliant 
on external financing are hurt more by the financial crisis, it is harder for them to borrow 
13 
 
compared with those firms not highly reliant on external financing. As a result, it is harder 
for them to grow or expand during the financial crisis period (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008).  
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Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development 
          The decrease of hedge funds activities during the 2008 financial crisis period 
documented by Ben-David et al. (2012) implies a possible withdrawal of institutional 
investors in the market. Meanwhile, Ben-David et al. (2012) report that the decrease of 
mutual fund activities for the same time period was not as severe, suggesting a less 
withdrawal of individual investors in the market compared to professional investors since 
mutual funds are primarily invested by retail investors. Bricker et al. (2011) confirm a 
smaller percentage of decrease on individual investors’ equity holding compared to the 
percentage of decrease of hedge funds activities. In addition, researchers (e.g. Hoffmann, 
Post, & Pennings, 2013; Dorn & Weber, 2013; Merkle & Weber, 2014) also find that 
individual investors were still very active during the financial crisis period in European 
market.  As a result, the earnings fixation effect is expected to increase during the 2008 
financial crisis period, leading to a higher accrual anomaly level. Also, because accrual 
anomaly could be arbitraged away due to hedge funds activities, the decrease of hedge 
funds activities itself could lead to an increase of accrual anomaly as well because less 
investors were trying to arbitrage accrual anomaly away. In addition, the increase of both 
arbitrage risk and transaction costs could also lead to an increase of accrual anomaly 
because these two factors prevent accrual anomaly to be arbitraged away successfully.  
Therefore, my first hypothesis is: 
 H1: The magnitude of accrual anomaly (mispricing of accruals) is higher during the 
financial crisis period than before the financial crisis period. 
15 
 
      During the 2008 financial crisis, firms highly reliant on external financing are hurt more 
by credit supply shock and have more difficulty to grow (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008). If the 
firm growth does explain accrual anomaly, I expect to see a lower level of accrual anomaly 
from firms highly reliant on external financing compared to those firms not highly reliant 
on external financing. In other words, the level of accrual anomaly among firms highly 
relying on external financing should be lower than the level of accrual anomaly among 
other firms, regardless of how the financial crisis influences accrual anomaly.   Therefore, 
my second hypothesis is:  
H2:  Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of accrual anomaly (mispricing of accruals) is 
lower for firms highly reliant on external financing than other firms during the 
financial crisis.  
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Chapter 4 Measurements and Research Design 
4.1 H1 Test 
         To test whether accruals mispricing is higher during the financial crisis period than 
the period before the financial crisis, I estimate following extended version of Ali et al.’s 
(2009) model:  
𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡+𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1                                                                                                     (1) 
Where: 
       𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 are the abnormal returns calculated from the 4
th to the 16th months after the 
end of the fiscal year. I follow Sloan (1996) and use size adjusted returns in my main 
analysis. I calculate the size adjusted returns by using the difference between monthly 
individual raw returns and monthly market capitalization-based Portfolio Index returns, 
both downloaded from CRSP and containing NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ common 
stocks of US companies. Returns are calculated for the 4th to the 16th months after the end 
of the fiscal year to ensure sufficient time has passed for financial reports to be released. 
       𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable set to zero for observations in the years before the financial 
crisis (i.e. 2004 - 2006), and otherwise set to one (2007 – 2009).   
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       𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  is total amount of accruals, which is the key variable of the analysis. 
I follow Hribar and Collins (2002) and use cash flow statement information to estimate 
accruals as the following7: 
TotalAccruals=EBXI-CFO                                                                                                 (2) 
   where EBXI is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; and 
CFO is operating cash flows (from continuing operations) taken directly from the statement 
of cash flows.8 In addition, following previous studies (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Richardson et al., 
2005; Lev et al., 2006), I use deflate total accruals by average total assets.  
       𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity.  
Book value of equity is for the fiscal year that ended at least four months after but less than 
sixteen months before the returns measurement month. The market value of equity is for 
the most recent calendar year-end. Book to Market ratio is included in the analysis to 
control any associated risk or mispricing (Ali et al., 2009).  
       𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulative stock returns for the six months preceding the return 
measurement period. It is included in the analysis to control any momentum related risk or 
mispricing (Ali et al., 2009).   
      𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents investor sentiment condition for each firm-year observation. 
In this study, I use the sentiment index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006).  Such index 
                                                          
7 Sloan (1996) uses balance sheet information to estimate accruals. Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest that 
accruals using cash flow statement information to estimate accruals are more accurate as compared to 
accruals estimated from balance sheet because accruals estimated from balance sheet could contain 
substantial measurement error due to divestitures of on-going businesses, mergers and acquisitions and 
foreign currency adjustments. 
8The cash portion of discontinued operations and extraordinary items should be subtracted from total cash 
from operations to arrive a cash flow from continuing operations. 
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is calculated based on six different proxies from previous studies: (1) closed-end fund 
discount (e.g., Lee, Shleifer & Thaler, 1991), (2) New York Stock Exchange share turnover 
(e.g., Baker & Stein, 2004), (3) the number of initial public offerings (e.g., Ritter,1991), (4) 
average first-day returns of IPOs (e.g., Ritter,1991), (5) the equity share in new equity and 
debt issues (e.g., Baker & Wurgler, 2000), and (6) the dividend premium (e.g., Baker et 
al.,2006). Sentiment is included in analysis as a control variable because it also affects 
earning fixation of naïve investors (Ali et al., 2009).   
          The coefficient 𝛽7 in the equation (1) represents the effect of the financial crisis on 
accrual anomaly and it is used to test H1. According to H1, the negative association 
between current total accruals and future returns is expected to be more pronounced during 
the financial crisis. Therefore, H1 predicts  𝛽7 <0.  The coefficient 𝛽1 captures the effect 
of the financial crisis on future abnormal returns. The financial crisis has a negative impact 
in capital markets and the coefficient 𝛽1 is expected to be negative. The coefficient 𝛽2 
represents the association between accruals and future abnormal returns. As Sloan (1996) 
documents, higher accruals are associated with a negative future abnormal return. 
Therefore, the coefficient 𝛽2  is expected to be negative and significant, indicating the 
presence of accrual mispricing. The coefficient 𝛽3 represents the effect of prior cumulative 
returns on future abnormal returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that stocks 
with high returns in the past continue to outperform stocks with poor prior performance. 
Therefore, the coefficient 𝛽3 is expected to be positive. The coefficient 𝛽4 captures the 
association between book to market ratio, and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find 
a positive relation between average returns and book-to-market ratio. Therefore 𝛽4  is 
expected to be positive. The coefficient 𝛽5 captures the effect of sentiment level on future 
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abnormal returns. Baker et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between investor 
sentiment and stock returns and therefore, the coefficient 𝛽5 is expected to be negative. 
The coefficient 𝛽6  represents the effects of investor sentiment on accrual anomaly. As 
discussed before, high investor sentiment could lead to a higher level of accrual anomaly 
and a stronger negative association between total accruals and future returns. Therefore, 
the coefficient 𝛽6 is expected to be negative.  
4.2 H2 Test 
        To test whether the increase in accrual anomaly is more pronounced for firms reliant 
on external financing during the financial crisis, I estimate the following model: 
𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽7𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1                                                                                       
(3) 
Where: 
𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms highly reliant 
on external financing and zero otherwise. Following Rajan and Zingales (1996), I calculate 
the level of external financing for firms as the ratio of capital expenditure financed by 
external funds ((financing ratio =(capital expenditure – cash flow from operations)/capital 
expenditure). A firm is deemed highly reliant on external finance when its financing ratio 
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is among the top 50% of the sample.  Other variables are defined the same as in equation 
(1). 
        The coefficient 𝛽11 in equation (3) represents the effect of firm capital structure on 
accrual anomaly during financial crisis and it is used to test H2. I expect the level of accrual 
anomaly during the financial crisis for firms that are highly reliant on external financing to 
be lower than those which do not highly rely on external finance during the financial crisis. 
Therefore, H2 predicts 𝛽11  >0. The coefficient 𝛽2  captures the effect of firm capital 
structure alone on future abnormal returns. Generally speaking, firms highly reliant on 
external financing have higher stock price and firm value (Masulis, 1983). Therefore, I 
expect the coefficient 𝛽2 to be positive and significant. Also, the coefficient 𝛽3 is expected 
to be negative and significant because accruals lead to a negative future abnormal return 
(Sloan1996).  
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Chapter 5 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Sample 
       I obtained company financial information from COMPUSTAT Database (North 
America) and stock return data from CRSP monthly return files. My initial sample includes 
all firm-years with available data on COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the period 2003–2010. 
Then I delete: 1) financial and utility firms (4900<SIC<4999; 6000<SIC<6999) since they 
are highly regulated by the government; 2) firms with negative total assets or book value 
of equity because these variables are used to standardize other variables and they can not 
be zero or negative (Beer, Hamdi & Zouaoui, 2013); 3) firms with book-to-market values 
within the top and bottom 1 percent to reduce outlier effects; 4) firm-years with year-end 
stock prices below $5 are deleted in order to reduce the effect of microstructure-induced 
return volatility (Conrad & Kaul, 1993). I also remove firms with total accrual values 
within the top and bottom 1 percent in order to further reduce the influence of outliers. My 
final sample includes 12,507 firm-year observations. Finally, I follow Clinch et al. (2010)9 
and delete the observations with missing data.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
       Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for (Panel A) and correlation among (Panel B) 
the annual variables used in the test of accrual anomaly before and during the financial 
crisis period. All variables are computed using data available for each year 2004-2009 in 
CRSP and Compustat. There are a total of 12,507 observations included. The mean 
(median) accrual value for the sample employed (for the period 2004 – 2009) is -0.06 (-
                                                          
9 Clinch et al. (2010) reduce their observations with missing financial statement information and return 
information. . 
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0.05), while the standard deviation is 0.07. The monthly abnormal returns are, on average, 
positive (0.03). The median of abnormal returns are negative and very close to 0 (-0.02). 
The mean of the sentiment index is positive but very small (0.002), indicating a low 
sentiment period on average from year 2004-2009. In addition, the correlation analysis 
shows that total accrual has a negative correlation with future stock returns as expected. 
Prior returns have a positive correlation with future stock returns as expected. However, 
sentiment shows a positive correlation with future returns. The financial crisis period 
(DFCit), Book to Market ratio (BooktoMarketit) and firms’ capital structure 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡) on the other hand, does not show any significant correlation with future 
stock returns. The descriptive statistic is generally consistent to the prior studies (e.g., Ali 
et al., 2009; Li, Niu, Zhang, & Largay, 2011). 
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Chapter 6 Results 
6.1 Testing of H1 
I first use OSL regression to test my prediction in H1. H1 states that the magnitude 
of accrual anomaly (mispricing of accruals) would be higher during the financial crisis 
period than in the period before the financial crisis. I predict that the slope coefficient on 
the interaction term 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 in eq.1 is negative. A negative coefficient 
means an increase in the accrual anomaly during the financial crisis.  
Panel A in table 2 reports the empirical results for H1 using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression. Overall, the results from OLS regression provides evidence that 
accrual anomaly increases during the financial crisis. Specifically, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 (coefficient =-0.50; standard error = 
0.14) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that, on 
average, accruals mispricing is higher during the financial crisis period than during the 
period before the financial crisis, suggesting the financial crisis actually increases the level 
of accrual anomaly in the market. To further confirm the result, I analyze the accrual 
anomaly separately in the period before and during the financial crisis (table 2); the 
regression results show that there is no accrual anomaly from year 2004 to year 2006, 
consistent with Green et al.’s (2011). However, the coefficient on the total accruals is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (coefficient =-0. 39; standard error = 
0.09) during the financial crisis period from 2007-2009. Therefore, the empirical results 
lead to a support to H1: financial crisis does increase the mispricing of accrual.  
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  The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with the 
predictions. For example, the coefficient on 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  (coefficient =0.01; 
standard error =0.01) is positive but insignificant; the coefficient on  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
(coefficient =0.09; standard error =0.06) is positive and insignificant, which is 
inconsistent with prior studies (e.g., Baker et al., 2006). The coefficient on 
 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (coefficient =0.03; standard error =0.01) is also positive and significant, 
consistent with Ali et al. (2009). 
6.2 Testing of H2 
H2 states that, ceteris paribus, the increase in the magnitude of accrual anomaly 
(mispricing of accruals) is less for firms highly reliant on external financing than other 
firms during the financial crisis. I predict that the slope coefficient on the interaction term 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  in eq.3 is positive. A positive coefficient 
suggests that if firm growth explains accrual anomaly, the shock to relying firms’ growth 
caused by financial crisis can lead to a decline in the accrual anomaly among these firms.  
 Panel B in table 2 reports the empirical results for H2 using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression. Overall, the results from OLS regression analysis does not 
support H2: the coefficient on the interaction term 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  (coefficient =-0.01; standard error =0.23) is negative and statistically 
insignificant, suggesting  that here is no difference in the mispricing of accruals between 
firms highly reliant on external financing and other firms during the financial crisis. This 
result suggests that firm growth itself may not have any association with accrual anomaly 
and some possible association between these two found in previous studies could be due 
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to the correlation between accruals and firm-based variables used to measure the firm 
growth.  
  The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with the 
predictions. For example, the coefficient on 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  (coefficient =0.01; 
standard error =0.01) is positive but insignificant. The coefficient on 
 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡(coefficient =0.03; standard error =0.01) is also positive and significant, a 
result that is consistent with prior studies. However, the coefficient on  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
(coefficient =0.08; standard error =0.06) is positive and insignificant, indicating an 
inconsistent result with prior studies (e.g., Baker et al., 2006) and suggesting positive 
relationship between sentiment and future returns on the stock market.  
6.3 Robustness Test Results  
           To ensure the robustness of my results, I use firm-fixed effects to control for time-
invariant firm characteristics. In addition, I use market-adjusted abnormal return as a 
measure of abnormal returns (Clinch, Fuller, Govendir, and Wells, 2012). Specifically, I 
subtract the market returns (measured by the CRSP value-weighted market index returns) 
from individual firms’ returns in order to obtain the market abnormal returns. 
6.3.1 H1 & H2: Firm-fixed Effect Results 
I provide panel data regression analysis results for H1 and H2 when the Firm-fixed 
effect control is applied in the test in Table 3. Panel A in Table 3 shows that in H1 Test, 
the coefficient on the interaction term between 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 (coefficient =-
0.75; standard error = 0.13) is still negative and statistically significant. H2 test result 
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shown in Panel B indicates that the coefficient on the interaction term 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  (coefficient =0.11; standard error =0.23) is positive as we 
expect but insignificant, suggesting the same result as the one in my main analysis: firm 
growth influenced by firm’s capital structure does not create any impact on accrual 
anomaly during the financial crisis. Therefore, the Firm-fixed effect controlled regression 
analysis results for H1 and H2 tests are consistent with the results from the main analysis.  
6.3.2 Using Market-Adjusted Abnormal Return  
Table 4 provides the test results for H1 and H2 when market-adjusted abnormal 
return is used. The market adjusted abnormal return is measured by the difference between 
individual firms’ return and the CRSP value-weighted market index returns. The results 
from these two tests confirm the results from the main test. The results presented in Panel 
A show that the coefficient on the interaction term between 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 
(coefficient =-0.51; standard error = 0.14) is still negative and statistically significant.  
The test results for H2 shown in Panel B indicates that the coefficient on the interaction 
term 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  (coefficient =0.03; standard error 
=0.24) is positive as we expect but still insignificant.  
6.4 Additional Tests and Discussions 
       The main analysis and the robustness test results indicate that while the mispricing of 
accruals indeed increases during the financial crisis period from 2007-2009, firm growth 
influenced by firm’s capital structure does not have any impact on the accrual anomaly 
level. I interpret these results as possible evidence that there is an increase in earning 
fixation effect due to the possible change in investor composition. However, as discussed 
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in the previous sections, the change of accrual anomaly during financial crisis could be 
influenced by at least three other factors: arbitrage risk, transaction cost, and relative 
persistence of accruals to cash. The arbitrage risk and transaction costs could increase due 
to high uncertainty and risk in the market during the financial crisis and lead to an increase 
of accrual anomaly. If relative persistence of accruals to cash increase during the financial 
crisis, it will also lead to an increase of accrual anomaly. To rule out other possible 
explanations for the increase of accrual anomaly during the financial crisis period, I 
conduct additional analysis in this section to test the change of these factors during the 
financial crisis period. Employing the measures and proxies used by Green et al (2011), I 
analyze the changes in these factors from 2004 to 2009 using OLS regression analysis as 
the following: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡=𝛽0𝑡+ 𝛽1𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 +𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1                                                     (4) 
Where:  
YEARS is set to 1 in 2004 and incremented by one each year thereafter.  
The variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 contains three proxies for three factors mentioned above, 
including:  
AGG_RISKt is the market capitalization-weighted average of idiosyncratic risk of 
extreme accruals decile firms for year t, where idiosyncratic risk is measured by the log of 
the standard deviation of residuals from a time-series market model regression of the daily 
stock returns of extreme accruals decile firms on the CRSP value-weighted index in year t. 
This proxy measures the annual arbitrage risk.  
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AGG_PRICEt is the equal-weighted average of the price of extreme accruals decile 
firms for each year t. This proxy measures the annual transaction cost. The higher 
AGG_PRICEt is, the lower the transaction cost would be.  
AGG_RELPERSISTt is𝐴𝑡/𝐵𝑡 , where 𝐴𝑡  and 𝐵𝑡  are the estimated coefficients in the 
yearly cross sectional regressions:  
𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1/𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1   = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡+𝐴𝑡  𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1+𝐵𝑡 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 +𝑈𝑖,𝑡       (5) 
    𝐼𝐵 is annual income before extraordinary items, 𝐶𝐹 is annual operating cash flows, 
𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐼𝐵 –𝐶𝐹, 𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑇𝐴 is average annual total assets, and 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is an intercept (outliers are 
deleted at the extreme 1% of each variable each year). 
   Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the EXPLAN variables (Panel A) and 
correlations among them (Panel B). The descriptive statistic results are consistent with 
Green et al (2011) except for variable AGG_PRICEt since the measurement for proxy I 
employ is slightly different from the one used in Green et al.’s  (2011).10  
6.4.1 Arbitrage Risk Explanation Test   
Using equation 4, I regress AGG_RISKt against 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡  to measure the change in 
arbitrage risk from 2004-2009. Results are reported in Table 6. The positive and significant 
coefficient of 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (coefficient =0.06; standard error = 0.00) indicates an increase in the 
                                                          
10 Green et al. (2011) use AGG_PRICEt, the equally-weighted average of PRICEit, the log of extreme 
accruals decile firm i‘s average price for the 125 trading days ending March 31st of year t as the proxy for 
transaction costs.  
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arbitrage risk during the financial crisis.  As discussed in the previous section, an increase 
in the arbitrage risk could lead to an increase in accrual anomaly. 
6.4.2 Transaction Costs Explanation Test   
Similar to the test in 6.4.1, I regress AGG_PRICEt against  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡  with control 
variable 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 to examine the change in transaction costs from 2004-2009. I report the 
results in Table 7. The negative and significant coefficient on 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (coefficient =-2.56; 
standard error = 0.04 ;) indicates a decrease of price and an increase in transaction cost 
during the financial crisis. As discussed in the previous section, an increase in the 
transaction costs could lead to an increase in accrual anomaly. 
6.4.3 Relative Persistence Explanation Test   
To test the influences of the relative persistence of accrual to cash on accrual anomaly, 
I regress AGG_RELPERSISTt against  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡  with control variable 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠  to test their 
movement from 2004-2009. The results are presented in Table 8. The positive and 
significant coefficient of 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (coefficient =0.94; standard error = 0.01 ;) indicates an 
increase in the relative persistence of accrual to cash, which means a decrease in the gap 
between the persistence of accrual and persistence of cash after the occurrence of financial 
crisis. According to discussion in the previous section, this decrease should lead to a 
decrease rather than an increase in accrual anomaly.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
Using data from Compustat and CRSP, I document that the magnitude of accrual 
anomaly increases during the financial crisis period. Investigating why accrual anomaly 
change during the financial crisis, I examine that whether earning fixation, firm growth, 
arbitrage risk, transaction cost, and the relative persistence of accrual to cash can explain 
the increase of the accrual anomaly. My empirical analysis suggests that the decrease of 
hedge funds activities, as well as the increases of arbitrage risk and transaction costs during 
the financial crisis, could be the main reasons for the increase in accrual anomaly during 
that time period. In addition, this study examines whether accrual anomaly increases 
differently for firms during financial crisis because the firm growth of firms with different 
capital structure were hurt differently during the financial crisis. My analysis finds that the 
accrual anomaly during the 2008 financial crisis is similar for firms highly reliant on 
external financing and other firms. As discussed above, there are multiple possible reasons 
for the increase of accrual anomaly during the financial crisis period and the change of 
earnings fixation effect in the market is one of them. Therefore, relying on the exogenous 
shock on firms’ growth, this paper provides evidence more consistent with the earning 
fixation explanation rather than the growth explanation for accrual anomaly.  
However, two limitations are in order. First, although I argue that hedge fund 
activities are the main contributor to the increase in accrual anomaly, I cannot test this 
explanation directly due to lack of data. Second, because of data constraint, I am not able 
to distinguish the alternative explanations among earning fixation, arbitrage risk and 
transaction costs. Therefore, further study could test hedge fund activities directly during 
the financial crisis to provide direct evidence. Furthermore, hedge funds activities are still 
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not direct measurement for earning fixation of investors. A better proxy for earning fixation 
of investors is needed for future study in order to distinguish and quantify the effects from 
earning fixation, arbitrage risk and transaction costs on accrual anomaly during financial 
crisis more clearly.    
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Tests  
This table reports the descriptive statistic (Panel A) for and correlation (Panel B) among 
the annual variables used in the time series test of accrual anomaly before and during the 
financial crisis period. All variables are computed using data available of each year 2004-
2009 in CRSP and Compustat. There are total 12,507 observations included. Eretit+1 is 
cumulative size-adjusted abnormal return for 12 months counting from 4 months after the 
fiscal year end and is measured by the difference between raw individual returns and 
capitalization index return; PriorRetit is cumulative individual stock returns of six months 
preceding the return measurement period; 𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 is total accruals and are calculated as 
Income before Extraordinary Item and discontinued operations (Compustat data item IBC) 
minus the operation cash flow (CFO), the difference between the net cash flow from 
operating activities (Compustat data item OANCF) and discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items (Compustat data item XIDOC); BooktoMarketit is Book-to-Market 
ratio and is measured as book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity;   𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕  represents investor sentiment condition for each firm-year 
observation and is measured by the sentiment index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006); 
DFCit  is a dummy variable set to zero for observations in the years before the financial 
crisis (i.e. 2004 - 2006) and to one otherwise (2007 – 2009).  𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒔𝒊,𝒕 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms highly relying on external financing 
and zero otherwise and is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure subtracts cash flow 
from operations divided by capital expenditure (financing ratio). A firm is deemed highly 
relying on external finance when its financing ratio is among top 50% of the sample. The 
sample includes all U.S. firms between 2004 and 2009 with the required variables to 
calculate Total Accruals, excluding financial and utility firms (4900 <=SIC <=4999 and 
6000 <=SIC <=6999), firms with negative book value of equity, and firms with book-to-
market (BM) values in the top and bottom 1 percent.  *** and ** indicate two-tailed 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Summary statistics of key variables (12507 Observations)  
 Mean Median Std Dev 
𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 0.03 -0.02 0.38 
DFCit 0.46 0 0.50 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 0.47 0 0.50 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 
PriorRetit 0.08 0.05 0.30 
BooktoMarketit 0.50 0.43 0.30 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 0.002 0.02 0.09 
 
Panel B. Pearson correlation coefficients (12507 Observations) 
 𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 DFCit 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 PriorReti
t 
BooktoMarketi
t 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 1 -0.01 0.004 -
0.02**
* 
0.03*** 0.008 0.02** 
DFCit -0.01 1 -0.07*** -
0.12**
* 
-0.12*** 0.18*** -0.51*** 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 0.004 -
0.07**
* 
1 0.08**
* 
-0.04*** 0.12*** 0.03*** 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.02** -
0.12**
* 
0.08*** 1 -0.05*** -0.01 0.07*** 
PriorRetit 0.03*** -
0.12**
* 
-0.04*** -
0.05**
* 
1 -0.03*** 0.08*** 
BooktoMarketit 0.008 0.18**
* 
0.12*** -0.01 -0.03*** 1 -0.21*** 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 0.02** -
0.51**
* 
0.03*** 0.07**
* 
0.08*** -0.21*** 1 
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Table 2 
OLS Regression Results for H1 and H2 Test 
This table presents the OLS regression results testing the effect of financial crisis on accrual 
anomaly. Panel A reports the results for H1 test; Panel B reports the results for H2 test. 
The dependent variable is size-adjusted abnormal returns in year t+1 (Eretit+1). The sample 
consists of 12507 firm-year observations from 2004-2009. The definitions of other 
variables are provided in Table 1. *** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively. Standard error clustered by firm is included in brackets. 
Panel A: H1 Test using size-adjusted return  
 Model 2004-2006 
Coeff. 
Model 2007-2009 
Coeff. 
Model 2004-2009 
Coeff. 
Intercept  0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
DFCit   -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.39*** 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
PriorRetit 0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
BooktoMarketit 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 0.09 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.45 
(1.69) 
-0.29 
(0.80) 
-0.23 
(0.72) 
DFCit∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡     -0.50*** 
(0.14) 
Adjusted R-Square 0.51% 0.57% 0.36% 
Observations  6741 5766 12507 
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Panel B: H2 Test using size-adjusted return   
 Model 2004-2009 
Coeff. 
Intercept  0.01 
(0.01) 
DFCit 0.00 
(0.01) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 0.03** 
(0.01) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.15 
(0.13) 
PriorRetit 0.03** 
(0.01) 
BooktoMarketit 0.01 
(0.01) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 0.08 
(0.06) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.21 
(0.73) 
DFCit∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.46** 
(0.18) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.06*** 
(0.02) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.04 
(0.16) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.01 
(0.23) 
Adjusted R-Square 0.53% 
Observations 12507 
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Table 3 
Firm-fixed Effects Regression on H1 Test and H2 Test 
This table presents Firm-fixed effects regression results. Panel A reports the results for H1 
test; Panel B reports the results for H2 test.  The dependent variable is size-adjusted 
abnormal returns in year t+1 (Eretit+1). The sample consists of 12507 firm-year 
observations from 2004-2009. Full variable definitions are provided in Table 1 and *** 
and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Standard 
error clustered by firm is included in brackets. 
Panel A: H1 Test with firm fixed effects 
 Model 2004-2006 
Coeff. 
Model 2007-2009 
Coeff. 
Model 2004-2009 
Coeff. 
Intercept  N/A N/A N/A 
DFCit   -0.13*** 
(0.01) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.82*** 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
PriorRetit -0.37*** 
(0.02) 
-0.28*** 
(0.02) 
-0.18*** 
(0.01) 
BooktoMarketit 0.97*** 
(0.04) 
0.53*** 
(0.03) 
0.46*** 
(0.02) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.25** 
(0.12) 
0.73*** 
(0.08) 
0.47*** 
(0.06) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -3.63** 
(1.60) 
-1.34 
(0.82) 
-1.39** 
(0.68) 
DFCit∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡     -0.75*** 
(0.13) 
R-Square 56.10% 51.16% 33.14% 
Observations  6741 5766 12507 
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Panel B: H2 Test with firm fixed effects   
 Model 2004-2009 
Coeff. 
Intercept  N/A 
DFCit -0.08*** 
(0.02) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 0.08*** 
(0.01) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.15 
(0.15) 
PriorRetit -0.18*** 
(0.01) 
BooktoMarketit 0.46*** 
(0.02) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 0.46*** 
(0.06) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -1.53** 
(0.68) 
DFCit∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.78*** 
(0.19) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.11*** 
(0.02) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.25 
(0.18) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.11 
(0.23) 
Adjusted R-Square 33.65% 
Observations 12507 
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Table 4 
The OLS Regression Results for H1 and H2 Test using Market Adjusted Abnormal 
Returns 
This table presents the OLS regression results for H1 and H2 test using market adjusted 
abnormal return. Panel A reports the results for H1 test; Panel B reports the results for H2 
test. The dependent variable is market adjusted abnormal returns in year t+1 (Eretit+1). The 
sample consists of 12507 firm-year observations from 2004-2009. Full variable definitions 
are provided in Table 1 and *** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. Standard error clustered by firm is included in brackets. 
Panel A: H1 Test using alternative abnormal return 
 Model 2004-2006 
Coeff. 
Model 2007-2009 
Coeff. 
Model 2004-2009 
Coeff. 
Intercept  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
DFCit   0.00 
(0.01) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
PriorRetit 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
BooktoMarketit 0.00 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.53*** 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.07) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.82 
(1.64) 
-0.16 
(0.86) 
-0.32 
(0.77) 
DFCit∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡   -0.51*** 
(0.14) 
Adjusted R-Square 0.62% 0.94% 0.89% 
Observations  6741 5766 12507 
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Panel B: H2 Test using alternative abnormal return  
 Model 2004-2009 
Coeff. 
Intercept  0.02 
(0.01) 
DFCit 0.02 
(0.01) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 0.03** 
(0.01) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.16 
(0.12) 
PriorRetit -0.01 
(0.01) 
BooktoMarketit 0.01 
(0.01) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.24*** 
(0.06) 
  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.30 
(0.77) 
DFCit∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.51*** 
(0.18) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.05** 
(0.02) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 -0.06 
(0.16) 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 0.03 
(0.24) 
Adjusted R-Square 1.00% 
Observations 12507 
  
45 
 
TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Tests 
This table reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) for and correlations (Panel B) among the 
annual aggregate variables used in the time-series tests of alternative explanations of the 
increase of accrual anomaly during the financial crisis. All variables are computed using 
data available of each year 2004-2009 in CRSP and Compustat. YEARS is set to 1 in 2004 
and incremented by one each year thereafter. AGG_RISKt is the market capitalization-
weighted average idiosyncratic risk of extreme accruals decile firms for year t measured 
by the log of the standard deviation of residuals from a time-series market model regression 
of the daily stock returns of extreme accruals decile firms on the CRSP value-weighted 
index in year t. AGG_PRICEt is the equal-weighted average of price of extreme accruals 
decile firms for each year t. AGG_RELPERSISTt is At / Bt where At and Bt are the 
estimated coefficients in the yearly cross sectional regressions IBi,t+1 / AVGTA i,t+1 = 
INTt + At xACC it / AVGTA it + Bt x CFit / AVGTA it + eit and IB is annual income 
before extraordinary items, CF is annual operating cash flows, ACC = IB – CF, AVGTA 
is average annual total assets, and INT is an intercept (outliers are deleted at the extreme 
1% of each variable each year).  
Panel A. Summary statistics of explanatory variables (12507 Observations)  
 Mean  Median  Std Div 
AGG_RISKt -1.97 -2.00 0.08 
AGG_PRICEt 23.26  23.40 3.14 
AGG_RELPERSISTt 0.32 0.11 0.36 
 
Panel B. Pearson correlation coefficients (12507 Observations) 
 AGG_RISKt AGG_PRICEt AGG_RELPERSISTt 
AGG_RISKt 1 -0.48*** -0.29*** 
AGG_PRICEt -0.48*** 1 0.15*** 
AGG_RELPERSISTt -0.29*** 0.15*** 1 
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Table 6 
Arbitrage Risk Test 
This table reports the liner regression results using AGG_RISKt as the dependable variable 
and DFCit and Years as independent variable for the AGG_RISKt movement from 2004 to 
2009. Full variable definitions are provided in Table 1, Table 4 and *** and ** indicate 
two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Standard error clustered by 
firm is included in brackets. 
 
 
Panel A: Time Series Movement Analysis 
 Model 2004-2009 
 Coeff 
Intercept -2.00*** 
(0.00) 
DFCit 0.06*** 
(0.00) 
  
Adjusted R-Square                                                                             15.11% 
Observations                                                                                  12507 
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Table 7 
Transaction Costs Test 
This table reports liner regression results using AGG_PRICEt as dependable variable and 
DFCit and Years as independent variable for the AGG_PRICEt movement from 2004 to 
2009. Full variable definitions are provided in Table 1, Table 4 and *** and ** indicate 
two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Standard error clustered by 
firm is included in brackets. 
 
 
Panel A: Time Series Movement Analysis  
 Model 2004-2009 
 Coeff 
Intercept 26.53*** 
(0.02) 
DFCit -2.56*** 
(0.04) 
Years -0.89*** 
(0.01) 
Adjusted R-Square                                                                 72.48% 
Observations                                                                      12507 
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Table 8 
Relative Persistence Test 
This table reports the liner regression results using AGG_RELPERSISTt as dependable 
variable and DFCit and Years as independent variable for the AGG_RELPERSISTt 
movement from 2004 to 2009. Full variable definitions are provided in Table 1, Table 4 
and *** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Standard error clustered by firm is included in brackets. 
 
 
Panel A: Time Series Movement Analysis  
 Model 2004-2009 
 Coeff 
Intercept 0.75*** 
(0.00) 
DFCit 0.94*** 
(0.01) 
Years -0.36*** 
(0.00) 
Adjusted R-Square                                                                          72.54% 
Observations                                                                                 12507 
 
 
 
